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Abstract
We propose a principled framework that combines adversarial training and provable
robustness verification for training certifiably robust neural networks. We formulate
the training problem as a joint optimization problem with both empirical and prov-
able robustness objectives and develop a novel gradient-descent technique that can
eliminate bias in stochastic multi-gradients. We perform both theoretical analysis
on the convergence of the proposed technique and experimental comparison with
state-of-the-arts. Results on MNIST and CIFAR-10 show that our method can
consistently match or outperform prior approaches for provable l∞ robustness.
Notably, we achieve 6.60% verified test error on MNIST at  = 0.3, and 66.57%
on CIFAR-10 with  = 8/255.
1 Introduction
Vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial examples [23, 7] has spurred the development
of training methods for learning more robust models [27, 8, 31, 1]. Madry et al. [14] show that
adversarial training can be formulated as a minimax robust optimization problem as in (1). Given a
model fθ, loss function L, and training data distribution X , the training algorithm aims to minimize
the loss whereas the adversary aims to maximize the loss within a neighborhood S(x, ) of each input
data x as follows:
min
θ
E(x,y)∈X
[
max
x′∈S(x,)
L(fθ(x′), y)
]
(1)
In general, the inner maximization is intractable. Most existing techniques focus on finding an
approximate solution. There are two main approaches to approximate the inner loss (henceforth
referred to as robust loss). One direction is to generate adversarial examples to compute a lower
bound of robust loss. The other is to compute an upper bound of robust loss by over-approximating
the model outputs. We distinguish these two families of techniques below.
Adversarial training. To improve adversarial robustness, a natural idea is to augment the training
set with adversarial examples [11]. Using adversarial examples to compute the training loss yields a
lower bound of robust loss, henceforth referred to as adversarial loss. Madry et al. [14] propose to
use projected gradient descent (PGD) to compute the adversarial loss and train the neural network by
minimizing this loss. Networks trained using this method can achieve state-of-art test accuracy under
strong adversaries [2, 25]. More recently, Wong et al. [28] showed that fast gradient sign method
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(FGSM) [7] with random initialization can be used to learn robust models faster than PGD-based
adversarial training. In term of efficiency, FGSM-based adversarial training is comparable to regular
training. While adversarial training can produce networks robust against strong attacks, minimizing
the adversarial loss alone cannot guarantee that (1) is minimized. In addition, it cannot provide
rigorous guarantees on the robustness of the trained networks.
Provable robustness. Verification techniques [9, 5, 18, 17, 16], on the other hand, can be used to
compute a certified upper bound of robust loss (henceforth referred to as abstract loss). Given a
neural network, a simple way to obtain this upper bound is to propagate value bounds across the
network, also known as interval bound propagation (IBP) [15, 8]. Techniques such as CROWN [30],
DeepZ [20], MIP [24] and RefineZono [21], can compute more precise bounds, but also incur much
higher computational costs. Building upon these upper bound verification techniques, approaches
such as DIFFAI [15] construct a differentiable abstract loss corresponding to the upper bound
estimation and incorporate this loss function during training. However, Gowal et al. [8] and Zhang
et al. [31] observe that a tighter approximation of the upper bound does not necessarily lead to a
network with low robust loss. They show that IBP-based methods can produce networks with state-
of-the-art certified robustness. More recently, COLT [1] proposed to combine adversarial training
and zonotope propagation. Zonotopes are a collection of affine forms of the input variables and
intermediate vector outputs in the neural network. The idea is to train the network with the so-called
latent adversarial examples which are adversarial examples that lie inside these zonotopes.
Table 1: Comparison of different methods for training robust neural networks. We highlight the loss
function used in each method. If there is an abstract loss used in training or post-training verification,
we also list the corresponding verification method. We categorize the methods along five dimensions,
withX indicating a desirable property or an explicit consideration.
Method Loss Abstract loss Efficiency1 EmpiricalRobustness
Provable
Robustness
No weight2
tuning/scheduling
Baseline regular loss n/a X n/a
FGSM [7] adversarial loss n/a X X n/a
FGSM+random init [28] adversarial loss n/a X X n/a
PGD [14] adversarial loss n/a X n/a
COLT [1] latent adversarial loss RefineZono3 X X n/a
DIFFAI [15] abstract loss4 DeepZ X–5 X n/a
CROWN-IBP [31] regular loss+abstract loss CROWN + IBP X X
IBP method [8] regular loss+abstract loss IBP X X
AdvIBP adversarial loss+abstract loss IBP X X X X
1 The efficiency baseline is the training time for each epoch during regular training. X represents the training time is comparable to the
baseline.
2 The weights here represent the weights for the different losses if there are multiple of them.
3 RefineZono is not used to construct an abstract loss. Instead, it is used to generate latent adversarial examples and for post-training
verification.
4 In their experiments, DIFFAI shows that adding regular loss with a fixed weight can achieve better performance.
5 DIFFAI can also use IBP for training and verification for improved efficiency. However, the best robustness results are achieved using
DeepZ.
This work: a principled framework for combining adversarial loss and abstract loss. We first
start with the observation that there is a substantial gap between the provable robustness obtained
from state-of-art verification tools and the empirical robustness of the same network against strong
adversary in large-scale models. In this paper, we propose to bridge this gap by marrying the strengths
of adversarial training and provable bound estimation techniques. Minimizing adversarial loss and
minimizing abstract loss can be viewed as bounding the true robust loss from two ends. We argue
that simultaneously reducing both losses is more likely to produce a network with good empirical and
provable robustness. From an optimization perspective, this amounts to an optimization problem with
two objectives and can be solved using gradient descent methods if both objectives are semi-smooth.
The challenge is how to balance the minimization of these two objectives during training. In particular,
computing the gradient based on a weighted-sum of the objectives can result in biased gradients.
Inspired by the work on moment estimates [10], we propose a novel joint training scheme to compute
the weights adaptively and minimize the joint objective with unbiased gradient estimates. For efficient
training, we instantiate our framework in a tool called AdvIBP , which uses FGSM and random
initialization for computing the adversarial loss and IBP for computing the abstract loss. We validate
our approach on a set of commonly used benchmarks demonstrate and demonstrate that AdvIBP
can learn provably robust neural networks that match or outperform state-of-art techniques. We
summarize and compare the key features of prior methods and AdvIBP in Table 1.
2
Main contributions. In short, our key contributions are:
• A novel framework for training provably robust deep neural networks. The framework
marries the strengths of adversarial training and provable upper bound estimation in a
principled way.
• A novel gradient descent method for two-objective optimization that uses moment estimates
to address the issue of bias in stochastic multi-gradients. We also perform theoretical
analysis of the proposed method.
• Experiments on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets show the proposed method can achieve
state-of-the-art performance for networks with provable robustness guarantees.
2 Background
In this paper, we consider an adversary who can perturb an input x∈X from a data distribution X
arbitrarily within a small  neighborhood of the input. In the case of l∞ perturbation, which we
experiment with later, we define the allowable adversarial input set as S(x, )={x′|‖x′−x‖∞≤}.
We define a L-layer neural network parameterized by θ as a function fθ recursively as:
fθ(x)=z
(L), z(l)=W (l)h(l−1)+b(l), h(l)=σ(l)(z(l))
where l ∈ {1, · · ·, L−1}, z represent the pre-activation neuron values, h represent post-activation
neuron values and σ is an element-wise activation function. We denote h(l)θl the mapping applied at
layer l with parameter θl and the network can be represented as fθ = h
(L)
θL
◦ h(L−1)θL−1 · · · ◦ h
(1)
θ1
.
In classification, the provable robustness seeks for the lower bounds of the margins between the
ground-truth logit and all other classes. Let vector m be the margins between the ground-truth class
and all other classes. Each element in m is a linear combination of the output [27]: cT fθ(x), where
c is set to compute the margin. We define the lower bound of m in S(x, ) as m(x, ; θ). When all
elements of m(x, ; θ)>0, x is verifiably robust for any perturbation with l∞-norm less than .
Interval bound propagation (IBP). Interval bound propagation uses a simple bound propagation
rule. For the input layer we define element-wise upper and lower bound for x, z(l) and h(l) as
xL≤x≤xU , z(l)≤z(l)≤z(l) and h(l)≤h(l)≤h(l). For affine layers, we have:
z(l)=W (l)−·h(l−1)+W (l)+·h(l−1)+b(l),
z(l)=W (l)−·h(l−1)+W (l)+·h(l−1)+b(l)
where W (l)−= min(0,W (l)) and W (l)+= max(0,W (l)). Note that h
(0)
=xU and h(0)=xL. For
monotonic increasing activation functions σ, we have h
(l)
= σ(z(l)) and h(l) = σ(z(l)).
We define mIBP(x, ; θ) as the lower bound of the margin obtained by IBP which is an underapprox-
imation of m(x, ; θ). More generally, we use mabstract(x, ; θ) as the lower bound of the margin
obtained by abstract methods. When mabstract(x, ; θ)≥0, x is verifiably robust by the abstract
method for any perturbation with l∞-norm less than . Additionally, Wong and Kolter [27] showed
that for cross-entropy (CE) loss:
max
x′∈S(x,)
L(fθ(x′), y) ≤ L(−mabstract(x, ; θ), y; θ) (2)
IBP or other abstract methods gives a tractable upper bound of the inner-max in (1) and we refer it as
abstract loss. In practice, solely minimizing abstract loss can be unstable and hard to tune [15, 8]. To
mitigate this instability, prior works [15, 8, 31] propose to stabilize the minimization of the abstract
loss by adding normal regular loss in the objective. More specifically, the new objective can be
formed as follows:
L(θ) = κ1L(fθ(x), y) + κ2L(−mabstract; y; θ) (3)
The coefficients κ1 and κ2 are hand-tuned to balance the minimization between regular loss and
abstract loss. The goal is to improve the robustness of the trained model while avoiding the instability
caused by loose abstract loss with respect to the true robust loss. Among different abstract methods,
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computing IBP bounds only requires two simple forward passes through the network and is thus
computationally efficient. The downside of IBP, however, is that it can lead to loose upper bounds.
Mirman et al. [15], Gowal et al. [8] propose to combine regular loss and IBP abstract loss as (3).
CROWN-IBP [31] uses a mixture of linear relaxation and IBP to compute the abstract loss and jointly
minimize it with the regular loss. While the approaches based on (3) produce state-of-the-art results
on a set of benchmarks, this type of works rely on an ad hoc scheduler to tune the weights between the
regular loss and the abstract loss during training. In addition, regular loss is a loose lower bound of
robust loss and minimizing the regular loss does not directly guide the training to a robust model. In
this paper, we show that it is better to combine adversarial loss and abstract loss while leveraging the
efficiency of IBP. Moreover, we can eliminate weight tuning and scheduling in a principled manner.
3 Methodology
Overview. Let the perturbed input be xadv. The relations among adversarial loss, robust loss and
IBP abstract loss are as follows.
L(fθ(xadv), y)≤ max
x′∈S(x,)
L(fθ(x′), y)≤L(−mIBP(x, ); y; θ) (4)
We note that (4) holds for general adversarial training and provable robustness methods. Specifically
adversarial loss provides a lower bound of robust loss and minimizing this loss can result in good
empirical robustness. Latent adversarial examples [1], for instance, can be used to construct a
different adversarial loss. However, a smaller latent adversarial loss does not necessarily indicate
better certified robustness. COLT [1] uses multiple regularizers to mitigate this issue. On the other
hand, minimizing the abstract loss can help to train a network with certified robustness. In this case,
the choice of verification methods used in computing the abstract loss can significantly influence
the final training outcome. For instance, training with the IBP abstract loss can result in a network
that is amenable to IBP verification. The true robustness of the network or the robustness attainable
under the given neural network architecture, however, could still be far away from this bound. In
fact, a small gap between empirical robustness and provable robustness does not necessarily indicate
the attainment of good robustness (the extreme case would be a ReLU network with only positive
weights). Thus, the tightness of both losses relative to robust loss is critical to improving the model’s
true robustness.
We consider the joint minimization of adversarial loss and abstract loss as a two-objective optimization
problem. A straightforward way to solve this joint optimization problem is to optimize a weighted
sum of the objectives. This leads to the following objective similar to (3):
L(θ) = κ1L(fθ(xadv), y) + κ2L(−mIBP; y; θ) (5)
However, this simple linear-combination formulation is only sensible when the two objectives are
not competing, which is rarely the case. The conflicting objectives require modeling the trade-off
between objectives, and are generally handled by adaptive weight updates [19]. This approach,
however, faces the issue that even though the stochastic gradients for each objective are unbiased
estimates of the corresponding full gradients, the weighted sum of the stochastic gradients is a biased
estimate if the weights are associated with the sampled gradients. This bias can cause instability
and local optima issues [13]. In this paper, we leverage moment estimates to compute the weights
adaptively and ensures their independence from the corresponding sampled gradients to eliminate the
bias. Minimizing the two objectives jointly tightens the approximation of robust loss from both ends.
For efficient training, we develop AdvIBP using FGSM+random init to compute adversarial loss and
IBP to compute abstract loss.
3.1 Joint Training as Two-Objective Optimization
We propose a two-objective optimization method inspired by [6, 32] to choose the gradient descent
direction that reduces adversarial loss and abstract loss simultaneously. Let the adversarial loss be
Ladv(θ) and IBP abstract loss be LIBP(θ). Their gradients with respect to θ are denoted by
gadv = ∇θLadv(θ), gIBP = ∇θLIBP(θ)
To balance between the two objectives, we update the network parameters in the direction of the
angular bisector of the two gradients. Then, we average the projected vectors of the two gradients
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on this direction. If 〈gadv, gIBP〉>0, this results in an update that is expected to reduce both losses
to improve the adversarial accuracy and tighten IBP. If 〈gadv, gIBP〉≤0, taking the angular bisector
direction results in an update that improves the objective functions little or not at all for either
objective. In this case, we project one of the gradients onto the hyperplane that is perpendicular
to the other gradient. The idea is that when two gradients disagree with each other, we prioritize
the minimization of one of the objectives. The final gradient guides the search in the direction that
reduces the prioritized objective while avoiding increasing the other objective. We use Figure 1 to
illustrate this computation.
To decide which direction to prioritize, the tightness of adversarial loss and abstract loss relative
to the ground-truth robust loss can be the determining factor. Wang et al. [26] propose the First-
Order Stationary Condition (FOSC) to quantitatively evaluate the adversarial strength of adversarial
examples. In general, the adversarial loss is closer to robust loss with stronger adversarial examples.
Let c(xadv) be FOSC value of xadv and ct be the threshold that indicates the desired adversarial
strength at the t-th epoch. Smaller FOSC values would indicate stronger adversarial examples. With
strong attacks (c(xadv)≤ct), adversarial training leads to robust models. Thus, we prioritize the
gradient of adversarial loss in this case. The idea is to drive the search to the region of robust models
with high accuracy and stabilize the minimization of abstract loss. With weak attacks (c(xadv)>ct),
minimizing adversarial loss does not necessarily imply better robustness. However, minimizing
abstract loss makes solving (1) tractably. We prioritize the gradient of abstract loss in this case.
Figure 1 provides a visualization of the final gradient computation in different cases.
gIBP
gfinal
gadv
gIBP
gfinal
gadv gIBP
gfinal
gadv
gadv
TgIBP  > 0 gadv
TgIBP  ≤ 0 and c(xadv)≤ ct gadvTgIBP  ≤ 0 and c(xadv) > ct
Figure 1: Three cases of computing gfinal from gadv and gadv.
Stochastic gradients. Since the data distribution X is unknown in practice, it is impossible to get
the full gradients, gadv and gIBP. We denote the realizations of the stochastic objectives at subsequent
training epochs 0, . . . , T−1 as Ladv,0(θ0), . . .,Ladv,T−1(θT−1) and LIBP,0(θ0), . . .,LIBP,T−1(θT−1).
The stochastic gradients gadv,t and gIBP,t are the evaluations of data points from mini-batches and
provide unbiased estimation of the full gradients. However, the stochastic gradient of the weighted-
sum objective at the t-th epoch becomes a biased estimate of the final gradient, gfinal. The bias is the
result of dependence between the weights and the corresponding stochastic gradients.
Unbiased weights computation. To eliminate this bias, we propose to compute the weights from the
estimates of the first and norm moments of the gradients instead of the stochastic gradients. The goal
is to ensure the independence of stochastic gradients and the corresponding weights. Let m1,t, m2,t,
v1,t and v2,t represent the moment estimates for gadv,t, gIBP,t, ‖gadv,t‖2 and ‖gIBP,t‖2 respectively. We
modify the moment estimate in [10] to meet the independence requirement. In Algorithm 1, the t-th
moment estimates are the exponential moving averages of the past stochastic gradients from epoch
0 to epoch t−1, where the hyper-parameters β1, β2∈[0, 1) control the exponential decay rates. The
moving averages themselves, m1,t,m2,t,v1,t,v2,t, are estimate of the first moment and the norm
moment of the true gradients. The independent mini-batch sampling guarantees the independence of
stochastic gradients. Thus, the moment estimates are independent from the current sampled stochastic
gradient. Then, we calculate the weights using the moment estimates in Algorithm 1 and update the
model parameters with unbiased gradient estimates.
The overall joint training algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. The regularization term κreg in line 11
is only used when prioritizing the minimization of abstract loss. The regularizer helps to bound the
convergence rate of training.
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Algorithm 1 Weight Updates
1: Input Exponential decay rates of the moving averages β1, β2 ∈ [0, 1)
2: Init m1,0 ← 0, m2,0 ← 0, v1,0 ← 0 and v2,0 ← 0
3: procedure COMPUTE_WEIGHTS(xadv, t, ct)
4: mˆ1,t ← β1 · mˆ1,t−1 + (1− β1) · gadv,t−1
5: mˆ2,t ← β1 · mˆ2,t−1 + (1− β1) · gIBP,t−1
6: vˆ1,t ← β2 · vˆ1,t−1 + (1− β2) · ‖gadv,t−1‖2
7: vˆ2,t ← β2 · vˆ2,t−1 + (1− β2) · ‖gIBP,t−1‖2
8: m1,t=mˆ1,t/(1−βt1) . Bias-corrected 1st moment
9: m2,t=mˆ2,t/(1−βt1)
10: v1,t=vˆ1,t/(1−βt2) . Bias-corrected norm moment
11: v2,t=vˆ2,t/(1−βt2)
12: if 〈m1,t,m2,t〉 > 0 then
13: γ= 12 〈m1,t+m2,t, m1,tv1,t +
m2,t
v2,t
〉/‖m1,tv1,t +
m2,t
v2,t
‖22
14: κadv =
γ
v1,t
, κIBP = γv2,t , κreg = 0
15: else
16: if c(xadv) ≤ ct then . check FOSC value
17: κadv = 1, κIBP = − 〈m1,t·m2,t〉v22,t , κreg = 0
18: else
19: κadv = − 〈m1,t·m2,t〉v21,t , κIBP = 1, κreg = 1/2
20: end if
21: end if
22: return κadv, κIBP, κreg
23: end procedure
Leveraging FOSC in joint training. In Algorithm 2, we use similar dynamic criterion FOSC as
in [26]. In the early stages of training, ct is close to the maximum FOSC value cmax, which can be
satisfied with weak adversarial examples. Thus, the early stages of training will mostly prioritize the
minimization of adversarial loss. This helps to avoid the instability caused by a loose abstract loss.
However, prioritizing the adversarial loss does not necessarily improve the verified robustness of the
models. Thus, we design the FOSC value ct so that it decreases linearly towards zero as training
progresses. As a result, in the later training stages, the joint training scheme will mostly prioritize the
minimization of the abstract loss to improve provable robustness.
3.2 Theoretical Analysis
We provide a theoretical analysis of our proposed joint training scheme to train IBP certified robust
networks. It aims to provide insights on how the ground-truth robust loss changes during training by
our joint training scheme. The gradient update and the prioritization scheme provide an approximate
maximizer for the inner maximization. Below, we provide theoretical analyses on how robust loss
changes when two gradients agree with each other and how abstract loss changes when two gradients
disagree with each other.
In detail, let x∗(θ)= arg maxx′∈S(x,) L(fθ(x′), y). xˆ(θ) is a δ-approximation solution to x∗, if it
satisfies that [26]
c(xˆ(θ))= max
x′∈S(x,)
〈x′−xˆ(θ),∇x′L(fθ(xˆ(θ)), y)〉≤δ (6)
Let the robust loss in (1) be L(θ), and its gradient be∇L(θ)=E[∇θL(fθ(x∗(θ)), y)]. We denote the
stochastic gradient of L(θ) as g(θ) = 1/|B|∑i∈B∇θL(fθ(x∗i (θ)), yi), where B is the mini-batch.
Similarly, we denote the abstract loss as L(θ), and its gradient as∇L(θ) = E[∇θL(−m(x, ); y; θ)].
We denote the stochastic gradient of L(θ) as g(θ)=1/|B|∑i∈B∇θL(−m(xi, ); yi; θ). Note that
E[g(θ)]=∇L(θ) and E[g(θ)]=∇L(θ). The adversarial loss, Ladv(θ), is E[L(fθ(xˆ(θ)), y)] and its
stochastic gradient is gˆ(θ)=1/|B|∑i∈B∇θL(fθ(xˆi(θ)), yi). We make assumptions similar to those
in Wang et al. [26] and present the theoretical analysis of our method below.
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Algorithm 2 Joint Training
1: Input Warm-up epochs Tnat and Tadv, train ramp-up epochs R, maximum FOSC value cmax
2: fθ0 ← WARM-UP(fθ0 , Tnat, Tadv)
3: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
4: ct=clip(cmax−(t−R)·cmax/T ′, 0, cmax)
5: Sample B={(x1, y1), . . ., (xB, yB)}∼(X ,Y)
6: for i = 0 to |B| − 1 do
7: t←RAMPUP_SCHEDULER(t, train, R)
8: xadv,i←FGSM+RANDOM_INIT(xi, yi, t)
9: end for
10: κadv, κIBP, κreg=COMPUTE_WEIGHTS(xadv, t, ct)
11: loss=κadvLadv(θt)+κIBPLIBP(θt)+κreg‖LIBP(θt)‖22
12: θt+1=θt−ηtgfinal(θt) . gfinal(θt): stochastic gradient
13: end for
14:
15: procedure WARMUP(fθ0 , Tnat, Tadv) . Warm-up phase
16: for t = 0 to Tnat − 1 do
17: Train on the regular loss L(fθt(x), y)
18: end for
19: for t = Tnat to Tnat + Tadv − 1 do
20: Train on the adversarial loss L(fθt(xadv), y)
21: end for
22: return fθ
23: end procedure
Assumption 1. The function L(θ;x) and L(θ;x) satisfies the gradient Lipschitz conditions s.t.
sup
x
‖∇θL(θ;x)−∇θL(θ′;x)‖2≤Lθθ‖θ−θ′‖2 sup
x
‖∇θL(θ;x)−∇θL(θ′;x)‖2≤Lθθ‖θ−θ′‖2
sup
θ
‖∇θL(θ;x)−∇θL(θ;x′)‖2≤Lθx‖x−x′‖2 sup
θ
‖∇θL(θ;x)−∇θL(θ;x′)‖2≤Lθx‖x−x′‖2
sup
x
‖∇xL(θ;x)−∇xL(θ′;x)‖2≤Lxθ‖θ−θ′‖2 sup
x
‖∇xL(θ;x)−∇xL(θ′;x)‖2≤Lxθ‖θ−θ′‖2
where Lθθ, Lθx, Lx,θ, Lθθ, Lθx, Lx,θ are positive scalars.
Assumption 1 was made in [26] to assume the smoothness of the loss function. Recent studies [3, 4]
help justify it by showing that the loss function of overparameterized neural networks is semi-smooth.
Let L=(LθxLxθ/µ+Lθθ) and L=(LθxLxθ/µ+Lθθ). For stochastic gradient descent, we can as-
sume that the variances of stochastic gradients g(θ) and g(θ) are bounded by constants σ, σ > 0. Let
∆=L(θ0)−minθ L(θ) and ∆=L(θ0)−minθ L(θ). Under Assumption 1 , we have the following
theoretical results.
Theorem 1. If the dot product of the gradients of the two objectives is greater than 0 and the step
size of the training is set to ηt=η= min(1/6L,
√
∆/TLσ2), then the expectation of the gradient of
robust loss satisfies
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[‖∇L(θt)‖22] ≤ 8σ
√
L∆
T
+
7L2θxδ
3µ
.
Theorem 2. If the dot product of the gradients of the two objectives is smaller or equal to 0,
adversarial loss is not tight enough (c(xadv)>ct), and the step size of training is set to ηt=η= min(2∗
E[LIBP(θt)]/L − 1/L,
√
∆/TLσ2) with E[LIBP(θt)]>1/2, then the expectation of the gradient of
IBP abstract loss satisfies
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[‖∇LIBP(θt)‖22] ≤ 2σ
√
L∆
T
(1 +
T−1∑
t=0
(1 + E[LIBP(θt)])2).
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The complete proof can be found in the Appendix. If the two gradients agree with each other (i.e.
their dot product is greater than 0), Theorem 1 suggests that the robust loss minimization can converge
to a first-order stationary point at a sublinear rate with sufficiently small δ. Using FOSC ensures
that the adversarial loss approximates the robust loss up to a precision less than δ as in (6). Note
that it is difficult for the perturbed input xadv to reach the maximum adversarial strength (minimum
FOSC value which is 0) as the model becomes more robust during training. Algorithm 2 will mostly
prioritize the abstract loss minimization when the two gradients disagree with each other since ct
is decreasing to 0. In this case, Theorem 2 suggests that the abstract loss (as obtained by IBP)
minimization can converge to a first-order stationary point at a sublinear rate. Although L¯IBP is
not guaranteed to converge, our joint training scheme actively reduces the abstract loss to avoid its
divergence. In practice, potential divergence of the L¯IBP is controlled with a stable training process
in our method. Although Theorem 2 requires E[LIBP(θt)]>1/2, the abstract loss will be sufficiently
small if the condition does not hold. With Theorem 1 and 2, the robust loss or its upper bound
abstract loss can be minimized at a sublinear convergence rate. These results provide theoretical
support for our approach.
4 Experiment
Experiment setup. We evaluate AdvIBP on all the network model structures used in [8, 31] on the
MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets with different l∞ perturbation bounds, . We denote these models as
DM-Small, DM-Medium and DM-Large. We perform all experiments on a desktop server using
at most 4 GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPUs. All models are trained using a single GPU except for
DM-Large which requires all 4 GPUs.
Metrics. We use the following metrics to compare the trained neural networks: (i) IBP verified error,
which is the percentage of test examples that are not verified by IBP, (ii) standard error, which is
the test error evaluated on the clean test dataset, and (iii) PGD error, which is the test error under
200-step PGD attack. Verified errors provide the worst-case test error against l∞ perturbations. PGD
errors provide valid lower bounds of test errors against l∞ perturbations.
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Figure 2: Comparison with the baseline.
Baseline comparison. We consider a baseline method that uses the same warm-up strategy in
Algorithm 2 but fixes the coefficients to κadv=1.0 and κIBP=1.0 (effectively using the weighted sum
method). As shown in Figure 2, AdvIBP , which automatically adapts the coefficients, reduces the
IBP verified errors by 9.1% to 31.9% compared with the baseline.
Comparison with prior works. Table 2 and 4 shows the standard, verified and PGD errors under
different  on CIFAR-10 and MNIST. On CIFAR-10, our method outperforms the state-of-art methods
on verified errors obtained from IBP. In addition to CROWN-IBP, we also present the best errors
reported by IBP method [8], MIP [29] and COLT [1]. Note that MIP [29] reports the verified error
obtained by mixed integer programming, which is able to compute the exact value of robust loss.
COLT [1] uses RefineZono to compute the verified errors and RefineZono is supposed to a much
higher precision than IBP. On both MNIST and CIFAR-10, even though our method does not use
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regular loss, we still achieve lower standard errors across different models in most cases. The verified
errors obtained by AdvIBP on MNIST can match the prior state-of-art results. The result of l∞
perturbation 2/255 outperforms existing approaches except for the results in [31, 21]. However, we
note here that both methods in [31, 21] use over-approximation methods with better precision in
both training and verification, which may result in significant computation overhead and memory
requirement. We hypothesize that the main reason for this performance gap is that with a relatively
small l∞ perturbation, the minimization of IBP abstract loss reduces the capacity of the models to
learn well as reflected by the higher standard errors.
Additionally, we compare AdvIBP with CROWN-IBP across a wide range of neural network models
(Table F) rather than on a few hand-selected models. In Table 3, we present the best, median and worst
verified and standard test errors for models trained on MNIST and CIFAR-10 using CROWN-IBP
(with default settings) and AdvIBP respectively. AdvIBP ’s best, median and worst verified errors
outperform those of CROWN-IBP in almost all cases.
Table 2: Evaluation on the CIFAR-10 dataset between models trained by AdvIBP and those by
CROWN-IBP. AdvIBP outperforms the state-of-art, CROWN-IBP, and other best reported results
under all perturbation and model settings if IBP is used to compute the verified errors. If different
network architectures and more precise verification methods are also considered, our IBP verified
errors still outperform the best prior results for both  = 8255 and  =
16
255 .
DM-Small model’s err. (%) DM-Medium model’s err. (%) DM-Large model’s err. (%) Best errors reported in literature (%)2
 (l∞ norm) Training Method
Standard Verified PGD Standard Verified PGD Standard Verified PGD Method Standard Verified
IBP method [8]3 39.22 55.19CROWN-IBP 38.15 52.57 50.35 32.78 49.57 44.22 28.48 46.03 40.28 MIP [29] 38.88 54.07
COLT [1] 21.60 39.50=
2
255
1
AdvIBP 42.33 56.00 50.08 35.36 52.27 43.75 40.61 51.66 46.97
IBP method [8]3 58.43 70.81CROWN-IBP 59.94 70.76 69.65 58.19 68.94 67.72 54.02 66.94 65.42 MIP [29] 59.55 79.73
COLT [1] 48.30 72.50=
8
255
AdvIBP 57.88 70.31 66.52 54.20 68.21 61.21 52.86 66.57 61.66
resultsunder IBP method [8]3 68.97 78.12CROWN-IBP 67.42 78.41 76.86 67.94 78.46 77.21 66.06 76.80 75.23 MIP [29] n/a n/a
COLT [1] n/a n/a=
16
255
AdvIBP 67.32 78.12 73.44 66.26 77.79 73.52 64.40 76.05 71.78
1 The verified error of CROWN-IBP in this setting is computed using CROWN.
2 Some of the best errors from literature are obtained from models with different architectures from ours. Some of the verified errors are also obtained using more precise
verification methods.
3 The results are reproduced by [31] on the same perturbation settings and models used by our method and CROWN-IBP. The verified error is obtained from IBP.
Table 3: Standard, verified and PGD test errors for a wide range of models trained on MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets using CROWN-IBP and AdvIBP . The purpose of this experiment is to compare
model performance statistics on a wide range of models, rather than a few selected models. For each
settings, we report 3 statistics, the smallest, median and largest verified errors. We also report the
standard and PGD errors in the same way.
Standard Error (%) Verified Error (%) PGD Error (%)
Dataset  (l∞ norm) Training Method
best median worst best median worst best median worst
Number of AdvIBP models
with lower verified errors
among all trained model structures
CROWN-IBP 2.49 3.50 5.39 4.81 6.33 8.82 3.42 4.94 7.33
 = 0.2
AdvIBP 2.41 3.36 5.29 4.76 6.13 8.52 3.31 4.70 7.01
9/10
CROWN-IBP 2.49 3.50 5.39 7.19 9.12 11.58 3.85 5.47 8.46
MNIST
 = 0.3
AdvIBP 2.41 3.36 5.29 7.21 8.86 11.32 4.04 5.40 8.00
8/10
CROWN-IBP 57.25 59.84 63.46 69.02 71.32 72.40 65.56 67.57 70.17
CIFAR-10  = 8255
AdvIBP 57.03 58.85 60.97 68.50 69.36 71.40 65.08 66.90 68.74
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AdvCROWN-IBP . In our joint training scheme, one can replace IBP with a more precise method for
computing the abstract loss. We present here the results of AdvCROWN-IBP which uses CROWN-
IBP to compute the abstract loss on the MNIST dataset. CROWN-IBP uses a linear combination of
CROWN bounds and IBP bounds to compute the abstract loss during the warm-up period. After the
warm-up period, the abstract loss is computed solely with IBP bounds. In Table 4, we can observe
that with a more precise abstract loss, our joint training scheme outperforms CROWN-IBP and
AdvIBP in IBP verified errors consistently across different model structures. In fact, to the best of
our knowledge, AdvCROWN-IBP achieves the best verified error rates compared to those reported
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in existing literature on the MNIST dataset across different choices of network models for these 
bounds.
Table 4: Evaluation on the MNIST dataset between models trained by AdvIBP , AdvCROWN-IBP
and those by CROWN-IBP. The CROWN-IBP result is from Table C. in [31]. AdvIBP achieves
competitive performance compared to CROWN-IBP on MNIST. AdvCROWN-IBP outperforms
CROWN-IBP under all settings, and achieves state-of-the-art verified errors on MNIST dataset for
l∞ robustness.
DM-Small model’s err. (%) DM-Medium model’s err. (%) DM-Large model’s err. (%)
 (l∞ norm) Training Method
Standard Verified1 PGD Standard Verified1 PGD Standard Verified1 PGD
CROWN-IBP 1.67 3.44 3.09 1.14 2.64 2.23 0.97 2.25 1.81
AdvIBP2 1.63 3.69 2.70 1.41 3.24 2.26 1.03 2.28 1.53 = 0.1
AdvCROWN-IBP 1.52 3.19 2.39 1.23 2.88 2.18 1.22 2.19 1.57
CROWN-IBP 2.96 6.11 5.74 2.37 5.35 4.90 1.62 3.87 3.81
AdvIBP2 4.15 7.68 5.81 2.33 5.37 3.54 1.58 4.70 2.59 = 0.2
AdvCROWN-IBP 3.22 6.02 4.50 2.45 5.16 3.27 1.51 3.87 1.98
CROWN-IBP 3.55 9.40 8.50 2.37 8.54 7.74 1.62 6.68 5.85
AdvIBP2 4.15 10.80 6.83 2.33 8.73 4.35 1.58 8.23 3.17 = 0.3
AdvCROWN-IBP 3.22 9.03 5.42 2.45 8.31 3.81 1.90 6.60 2.87
CROWN-IBP 3.78 15.21 13.34 3.16 14.19 11.31 1.62 12.46 9.47
AdvIBP 4.15 17.57 8.48 2.72 16.18 5.58 1.88 16.57 3.23 = 0.4
AdvCROWN-IBP 3.22 14.42 6.69 2.98 13.88 6.38 1.90 12.30 3.46
1 To further probe the true robustness of the trained models, we verify the robustness of the AdvIBP trained models with a more
precise method, RefineZono. The results are shown in Table C in the Appendix.
2 We have also tested three model structures similar to DM-Small, DM-Medium and DM-Large. Results are reported in Table B in
the Appendix. For these models, AdvIBP already outperforms CROWN-IBP in all settings.
5 Conclusion
We propose a new certified adversarial training framework that bridges the gap between adversarial
training and provable robustness from a joint training perspective. We formulate the joint training
as a two-objective optimization problem. The proposed framework facilitates the balance between
adversarial loss and abstract loss. The instantiation of the proposed framework, AdvIBP , can match
or outperform the state-of-art techniques in terms of standard errors and verified errors.
Broader Impact
Broad acceptance and adoption of large-scale deployments of deep learning systems rely critically on
their trustworthiness which, in turn, depends on the ability to assess and demonstrate the safety of
such systems. Concerns like adversarial robustness already arise with today’s deep learning systems
and those that may be exacerbated in the future with more complex systems. Our research has the
potential to enable the efficient training of robust deep learning systems. It can help unlock deep
learning applications that are currently not deployable due to safety, robustness or resource concerns.
These applications range from autonomous driving to mobile devices, and can benefit the society at
large.
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A Appendix
A.1 Additional Experiment Results
Table B presents the verified and standard errors for three model architectures in A and perturbation
settings used in [31]. On these three new models, AdvIBP outperform CROWN-IBP on the verified
and standard errors in all settings.
Table A: Model structures used in the experiments. "Conv k w×h+s" represents a 2D convolutional
layer with k filters of size w × h using a stride of s in both dimensions. "FC n" represents a fully
connected layer with n outputs. The last fully connected layer is omitted. All networks use ReLU
activation functions.
CNN-Small CNN-Medium CNN-Large
Conv 16 3× 3 + 2 Conv 32 3× 3 + 2 Conv 64 3× 3 + 2
Conv 32 3× 3 + 1 Conv 64 3× 3 + 1 Conv 64 3× 3 + 1
FC 512 Conv 128 3× 3 + 1 Conv 128 3× 3 + 1
Conv 256 3× 3 + 1 Conv 256 3× 3 + 1
FC 512 Conv 256 3× 3 + 1
FC 512 FC 512
Table B: The standard and verified errors for trained models on MNIST.
CNN-Small model’s err. (%) CNN-Medium model’s err. (%) CNN-Large model’s err. (%)
 (l∞ norm) Training Method
Standard Verified Standard Verified Standard Verified
CROWN-IBP 1.44 2.85 1.19 2.65 1.07 2.56
 = 0.1
AdvIBP 1.09 2.63 1.12 2.60 1.01 2.50
CROWN-IBP 2.81 5.79 2.57 4.93 2.34 4.71
 = 0.2
AdvIBP 2.38 5.22 2.33 4.66 2.04 4.37
CROWN-IBP 2.81 8.55 2.57 7.78 2.34 7.22
 = 0.3
AdvIBP 2.38 8.52 2.33 7.58 2.04 6.87
CROWN-IBP 2.81 13.74 2.57 13.53 2.34 12.00
 = 0.4
AdvIBP 2.38 13.24 2.33 13.36 2.04 11.98
A.2 Post-training verification.
A more precise verification usually comes at the cost of heavy computation (e.g. days vs seconds)
and intensive memory usage compared with IBP, and is thus more suitable post-training. In many
cases, we observe that the PGD errors of the models trained by AdvIBP are smaller than the PGD
errors of those trained by CROWN-IBP. To understand and evaluate the ground-truth robustness,
we apply RefineZono to verify the AdvIBP trained network. Table C shows the comparison on
MNIST. We randomly sample 1000 images from MNIST test dataset which has 10000 images in
total. RefineZono provides a tighter estimation of robust loss and smaller verified errors compared
with results obtained from IBP. More interestingly, in more than half of the cases, AdvIBP obtains a
lower verified error than the corresponding PGD error in CROWN-IBP. Since PGD error provides
a lower bound on the robustness of the network, this means that those networks (results in bold)
trained using AdvIBP are strictly more robust than those trained using CROWN-IBP with the same
architecture and perturbation settings.
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Table C: Evaluation on the MNIST dataset between models trained by AdvIBP and those by CROWN-
IBP. We verify the networks with RefineZono [21] for 1000 images randomly sampled from the test
dataset. The IBP verified errors are in parentheses. The CROWN-IBP result1is from Table C. in [31].
DM-Small model’s err. (%) DM-Medium model’s err. (%) DM-Large model’s err. (%)
 (l∞ norm)2 Training Method
Verified PGD Verified PGD Verified PGD
CROWN-IBP 3.44 3.09 3.26 2.82 2.10 (2.24) 1.81
 = 0.1
AdvIBP 2.90 (3.69) 2.70 2.80 (3.24) 2.26 1.90 (2.28) 1.53
CROWN-IBP 6.11 5.74 5.35 4.90 4.00 (3.87) 3.81
 = 0.2
AdvIBP 6.80 (7.68) 5.81 4.50 (5.37) 3.54 3.80 (4.70) 2.59
CROWN-IBP 9.40 8.50 8.54 7.74 6.203(6.68) 5.85
 = 0.3
AdvIBP 9.30 (10.80) 6.83 6.80 (8.73) 4.35 5.703(8.23) 3.17
1 The models reported in [32] were unavailable except DM-Large at the time when this paper was written. As a result, we only
report the verified errors obtained by RefineZono for the DM-Large models trained using CROWN-IBP.
2 We does not present the result of RefineZono at =0.4 due to the intensive GPU memory request. This configuration is not
reported in related works [1, 15, 20] on similar-scale models.
3 The computation of the verified error under this setting uses DeepZ on a single TESLA V100 GPU with 16GB memory and
costs 5 hours. RefineZono will take days to verify 1000 inputs.
A.3 The Computation of FOSC Value
We use Eq.(4) in Wang et al. [26] to compute the FOSC value for xadv generated by FGSM+random
initialization. Specifically, for an allowable perturbation input set S(x, ), the FOSC value of
xadv ∈ S(x, ) is computed as follows.
c(xadv) = ‖∇xL(fθ(xadv), y)‖1 − 〈xadv − x,∇xL(fθ(xadv), y)〉
For a mini-batch B, we compute the average of the FOSC values, c(x)=∑|B|−1i=0 c(xadv,i), and
compare it with ct to determine the prioritization direction (line 12 in Algorithm 1).
A.4 Training Time
In terms of runtime compared to the baseline method in Figure 2, the training times of the baseline
method for the three models were 5942, 38290, and 108683 seconds. On the same models and
hardware, AdvIBP took 6683, 43024, and 128747 seconds respectively. This shows that the automatic
coefficient computation in AdvIBP does not significantly increase training time. Furthermore, since
AdvIBP primarily combines FGSM-AT and IBP training, the efficiency of AdvIBP is comparable to
those of FGSM-AT and IBP.
In Table D, we present the training time of AdvIBP for the models used in our experiments. The
hyperparameters are chosen as stated in A.5. We perform layer-wise training for each model and
report the total training time here. All experiments are measured on a single GeForce GTX 1080 Ti
GPU with 11 GB RAM except DM-Large models where we used 4 GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPUs to
speed up training.
Table D: Average training time for different model architectures on each dataset.
Dataset DM-Small model (s) DM-Model model (s) DM-Large model (s)
MNIST 6683 43024 128747
CIFAR-10 63570 292863 527667
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A.5 Models and Hyperparameters
The models structures (DM-Small, DM-Medium and DM-Large) used in Table 2 and 4 are listed
in Table E. These three model structures are the same as those in [8, 31]. The large models are
trained on 4-GPUs. For small and medium sized models, we train them on a single GPU. The model
structures used in Table 3 are listed in Table F. These models are all trained on a single GPU. Training
hyperparameters are detailed below:
• For MNIST AdvIBP with train = 0.2 and train = 0.4 in Table 4, we set warm-up epochs
as Tnat = 10 and Tadv = 40. We use Adam optimizer and set learning rate to 5 × 10−4.
After warm-up phase, we train 200 epochs with a batch size of 256 and gradually ramp up
 from 0 to train in R = 50 epochs with extra 10 epochs training at train. We control the
linear decay rate of ct with T ′. We set T ′ = 50 starting with cmax=1e−4 for train=0.4 and
cmax=1e−5 for train=0.2. We reduce the learning rate by 4× at epoch 150 and 200. At the
layer-wise training stage, we start with learning rate 1.25× 10−4 and train 250 epochs each
layer. We reduce the learning rate by 4× at 50, 100 and 200 epoch. The exponential decay
rates for computing the weights are set to β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.99.
• For CIFAR-10 AdvIBP , we set train = 1.1 and train 3200 epochs each layer with a batch
size of 256. We set the first 800 epochs as warm-up phase with Tnat = 400 and Tadv = 410.
Then, we ramp up  for R = 1000 epochs with extra 20 epochs training at train. We set
T ′ = 280 starting with cmax=1e−3 for train= 8255 and = 16255 , and cmax=1e−5 for = 2255 .
Learning rate is reduced by 10× at epoch 2200 and 2700 from 5 × 10−4. At the layer-
wise training stage, we start with learning rate 5× 10−5 and train 3200 epochs each layer.
We reduce the learning rate by 10× every 1000 epochs. The exponential decay rates for
computing the weights are set to β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.99.
Table E: Model structures used in the experiments. "Conv k w×h+ s" represents a 2D convolutional
layer with k filters of size w × h using a stride of s in both dimensions. "FC n" represents a fully
connected layer with n outputs. The last fully connected layer is omitted. All networks use ReLU
activation functions.
DM-Small DM-Medium DM-Large
Conv 16 4× 4 + 2 Conv 32 3× 3 + 1 Conv 64 3× 3 + 1
Conv 32 4× 4 + 1 Conv 32 4× 4 + 2 Conv 64 3× 3 + 1
FC 100 Conv 64 3× 3 + 1 Conv 128 3× 3 + 2
Conv 64 4× 4 + 2 Conv 128 3× 3 + 1
FC 512 Conv 128 3× 3 + 1
FC 512 FC 512
Table F: 10 Model structures used in Table 3. "Conv k w × h + s" represents a 2D convolutional
layer with k filters of size w × h using a stride of s in both dimensions. "FC n" represents a fully
connected layer with n outputs. The last fully connected layer is omitted. All networks use ReLU
activation functions.
Name Model Strucutre
A Conv 8 3× 3 + 2 , Conv 16 3× 3 + 1, FC 100
B Conv 16 3× 3 + 2 , Conv 32 3× 3 + 1, FC 100
C Conv 32 3× 3 + 2 , Conv 64 3× 3 + 1, FC 100
D Conv 8 4× 4 + 2 , Conv 16 4× 4 + 1, FC 512
E Conv 16 4× 4 + 2 , Conv 32 4× 4 + 1, FC 512
F Conv 32 4× 4 + 2 , Conv 64 4× 4 + 1, FC 512
G Conv 8 3× 3 + 2 , Conv 16 3× 3 + 1, Conv 32 3× 3 + 1 , Conv 64 3× 3 + 1, FC 512
H (MNIST Only) Conv 16 3× 3 + 2 , Conv 32 3× 3 + 1, Conv 64 3× 3 + 1 , Conv 128 3× 3 + 1, FC 512
I (MNIST Only) Conv 8 3× 3 + 1 , Conv 8 4× 4 + 2, Conv 16 3× 3 + 1 , Conv 16 4× 4 + 2, FC 512
J (MNIST Only) Conv 16 3× 3 + 1 , Conv 16 4× 4 + 2, Conv 32 3× 3 + 1 , Conv 32 4× 4 + 2, FC 512
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Hyperparameters cmax and β. The hyperparameters unique to AdvIBP are the initial bound
for adversarial strength (FOSC value) and the exponential moving average decay rate in moment
estimates.
We choose the cmax based on the adversarially trained networks. Let us assume that we fix the
adversarial attack strategy to generate the perturbed inputs. For arbitrary networks without adversarial
training, it is easy for a perturbed input to flip the output. Though the adversarial strength of
the perturbed input is high (small FOSC value), the true robustness of the network is low. For
adversarially trained networks, it becomes hard to find a perturbed input that can flip the output
since these networks have strong empirical robustness. The adversarial loss computed based on the
generated perturbed inputs cannot approximate the robust loss tightly. As a result, a perturbed input
can have low adversarial strength. The FOSC value of a perturbed input against an adversarially
trained network provides an estimate of the largest FOSC value that an perturbed input can achieve
under the specified perturbation against a robust model. At the beginning of training, this estimate
allow us to train on weak adversarial examples to stabilize the training process. Wang et al. [26]
observes that training on adversarial examples of higher adversarial strength at later stages leads to
higher robustness. Thus, we set cmax to the FOSC value based on the adversarially trained network
initially. Then, after the warm-up phase, we gradually decrease ct. Decreasing ct requires stronger and
stronger adversarial examples to fulfill the condition c(xadv) ≤ ct where the optimization prioritizes
the minimization of adversarial loss.
Our choice of exponential average decay rate is inspired by the choices made in [10]. The decay
rate for the first order moment estimate is set to β1 = 0.9. The decay rate for the 2-norm moment
estimate is set to β2 = 0.99. In the future, we plan to experiment with more choices for the decay
rates to investigate how they influence the training process.
A.6 Layer-wise Training
We investigate the role of latent adversarial examples plays in our training process. Recall that
adversarial loss and latent adversarial loss are obtained from random initialized FGSM. We freeze
the current layer where attacks apply and train the rest of the network layer by layer. In Figure A,
we show the verified errors achieved when the parameters of the corresponding layer are frozen.
Note that while layer-wise latent adversarial loss helps with improving certified robustness, AdvIBP
already produces competitive results in terms of verified error at layer 0 (i.e. adversarial examples in
the inputs). In addition, the layer-wise training strategy produces most of the improvement in the first
two layers. One major difference between AdvIBP and COLT [1] is that we consider the tightness of
over-approximation explicitly and model the trade-off between latent adversarial loss and abstract
loss without requiring weight tuning. COLT [1] does not explicitly consider abstract loss but use
multiple regularization terms to control the over-approximation. Adding these regularization terms
does not guarantee tighter over-approximation and the coefficient for each regularization term needs
to be picked manually.
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Figure A: Effects of layer-wise training. The point at layer 0 represents standard adversarial training.
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During the experiments, we also observed that strong latent adversarial examples are easy to be found
if the over-approximation is loose. These latent adversarial examples are far from the boundary of the
over-approximation. This indicates that minimizing the latent adversarial loss alone cannot guarantee
better precision of over-approximation. This observation further motivates the need to explicitly
consider the minimization of the abstract loss and our proposed joint training scheme.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 1 and 2
Assumption 2. The robust loss and abstract loss are locally strongly concave with respect to µ and
µ in allowable adversarial attack set S(x, ). With the result of Lemma 1 in [26], we have for any θ1
and θ2 the following holds
L(θ1)≤L(θ2)+〈∇L(θ2), θ1−θ2〉+L2 ‖θ1−θ2‖22, L(θ1)≤L(θ2)+〈∇L(θ2), θ1−θ2〉+L2 ‖θ1−θ2‖22
where L = (LθxLxθ/µ+ Lθθ) and L = (LθxLxθ/µ+ Lθθ).
The relation between (1) and distributional robust optimization [22, 12] supports the strongly concave
assumption. The last assumption is common in stochastic gradient based optimization algorithms.
Assumption 3. The variances of stochastic gradients g(θ) and g(θ) are bounded by constants
σ, σ > 0:
E[‖g(θ)−∇L(θ)‖22] ≤ σ2, E[‖g(θ)−∇L(θ)‖22] ≤ σ2
where∇L(θ) and ∇L(θ) are full gradients.
The proof is inspired by Wang et al. [26]. Before we prove the theorems, we need the following
lemma from [26] to bound the difference between the gradient of adversarial loss and that of robust
loss.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the approximate stochastic gradient gˆ(θ) satisfies
‖gˆ(θ)− g(θ)‖2 ≤ Lθx
√
δ
µ
(7)
A.7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove Theorem 1 under the case where 〈m1,t ·m2,t〉 > 0.
L(θt+1) ≤L(θt) + 〈∇L(θt), θt+1 − θt〉+ L
2
‖θt+1 − θt‖22
=L(θt) + 〈∇L(θt),−ηt( 1
v1,t
gˆ(θt) +
1
v2,t
g(θt))〉+ Lη
2
t
2
‖ 1
v1,t
gˆ(θt) +
1
v2,t
g(θt)‖22
=L(θt)− ηt
v1,t
(1− Lηt
2v1,t
)‖L(θt)‖22 +
ηt
v1,t
(1− Lηt
v1,t
)〈∇L(θt),∇L(θt)− gˆ(θt)〉+ Lη
2
t
2v21,t
‖gˆ(θt)−∇L(θt)‖22
− 〈∇L(θt), ηt
v2,t
g(θt)〉+ Lη
2
t
v1,tv2,t
gˆ(θt)T g(θt) +
Lη2t
2v22,t
‖g(θt)‖22
=L(θt)− ηt
v1,t
(1− Lηt
2v1,t
)‖L(θt)‖22 +
ηt
v1,t
(1− Lηt
v1,t
)〈∇L(θt), g(θt)− gˆ(θt)〉
+
ηt
v1,t
(1− Lηt
v1,t
)〈∇L(θt),∇L(θt)− g(θt)〉+ Lη
2
t
2v21,t
‖gˆ(θt)− g(θt) + g(θt)−∇L(θt)‖22
− ηt
v2,t
〈∇L(θt),∇L(θt)〉+ ηt
v2,t
〈∇L(θt),L(θt)− g(θt)〉+ Lη
2
t
v1,tv2,t
gˆ(θt)T g(θt) +
Lη2t
2v22,t
‖g(θt)‖22
≤L(θt)− ηt
2v1,t
‖∇L(θt)‖22 +
ηt
2v1,t
(1 +
Lηt
v1,t
)‖g(θt)− gˆ(θt)‖22
+
ηt
v1,t
(1− Lηt
v1,t
)〈∇L(θt),∇L(θt)− g(θt)〉+ Lη
2
t
v21,t
(‖gˆ(θt)− g(θt)‖22 + ‖g(θt)−∇L(θt)‖22)
− ηt
v2,t
〈∇L(θt),∇L(θt)〉+ ηt
v2,t
〈∇L(θt),L(θt)− g(θt)〉+ Lη
2
t
v1,tv2,t
gˆ(θt)T g(θt) +
Lη2t
2v22,t
‖g(θt)‖22
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Taking expectation on both sides of the above inequality conditioned on θt, we have
E[L(θt+1)− L(θt)|θt] ≤− ηt
2‖∇L(θt)‖2 ‖∇L(θ
t)‖22 +
ηt
2‖∇L(θt)‖2 (1 +
Lηt
‖∇L(θt)‖2 )
L2θxδ
µ
+
Lη2t
‖∇L(θt)‖22
σ2 − ηt‖∇L(θt)‖2
〈∇L(θt),∇L(θt)〉+ 3Lη
2
t
2
=− ηt
2
‖∇L(θt)‖2 + 3
2
Lη2t +
ηt
2‖∇L(θt)‖2 (1 +
Lηt
‖∇L(θt)‖2 )
L2θxδ
µ
+
Lη2t
‖∇L(θt)‖22
σ2 − ηt‖∇L(θt)‖2
〈∇L(θt),∇L(θt)〉
=− ηt
2
‖∇L(θt)‖2 + 3
2
Lη2t +
ηtL
2
θxδ
2µ‖∇L(θt)‖2 +
Lη2tL
2
θxδ
2µ‖∇L(θt)‖22
+
Lη2t
‖∇L(θt)‖22
σ2 − ηt‖∇L(θt)‖2
〈∇L(θt),∇L(θt)〉
Assume the same direction condition gadv · gIBP > 0 holds and ηt = ‖∇L(θt)‖2 · η
E[L(θt+1)− L(θt)|θt] ≤ −η
2
(1− 3Lη)‖∇L(θt)‖22 +
η
2
(1 + Lη)
Lθxδ
µ
+ Lη2σ2 (8)
Taking telescope sum of (8) over t = 0, . . . , T − 1, we obtain
T−1∑
t=0
η
2
(1− 3Lη)E[‖∇L(θt)‖22] ≤ E[L(θ0)− L(θT )] + T
η
2
(1 + Lη)
L2θxδ
µ
+ TLη2σ2
Choosing η = min(1/6L,
√
∆/TLσ2), we can show that
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[‖∇L(θt)‖22] ≤ 8σ
√
L∆
T
+
7L2θxδ
3µ
which completes the proof.
A.7.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Now we prove Theorem 2 under the case where 〈m1,t ·m2,t〉 ≤ 0.
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L(θt+1) ≤L(θt) + 〈L(θt), θt+1 − θt〉+ L
2
‖θt+1 − θt‖22
=L(θt) + 〈∇L(θt),−ηt(1 + L(θt))g(θt) + ηt 〈m1,t,m2,t〉
v21,t
gˆ(θt)〉
+
Lη2t
2
‖〈m1,t,m2,t〉
v21,t
gˆ(θt)− (1 + L(θt))g(θt)‖22
=L(θt)− ηt(1 + L(θt))〈∇L(θt), g(θt)〉+ Lη
2
t (1 + L(θt))2
2
‖g(θt)‖22
+
ηt〈m1,t,m2,t〉
v21,t
〈∇L(θt), gˆ(θt)〉+ Lη
2
t 〈m1,t,m2,t〉22
2v41,t
‖gˆ(θt)‖22
− Lη
2
t 〈m1,t,m2,t(1 + L(θt))〉
v21,t
〈gˆ(θt), g(θt)〉
=L(θt)− ηt(1 + L(θt))(1− Lηt(1 + L(θ
t))
2
)‖∇L(θt)‖22
+ ηt(1 + L(θt))(1− Lηt(1 + L(θt)))〈∇L(θt),∇L(θt)− g(θt)〉
+
Lη2t (1 + L(θt))2
2
‖∇L(θt)− g(θt)‖22
+
ηt〈m1,t,m2,t〉
v21,t
〈∇L(θt), gˆ(θt)〉+ Lη
2
t 〈m1,t,m2,t〉22
2v41,t
‖gˆ(θt)‖22
− Lη
2
t 〈m1,t,m2,t(1 + L(θt))〉
v21,t
〈gˆ(θt), g(θt)〉
Taking expectation on both sides of the above inequality conditioned on θt, we have
E[L(θt+1)− L(θt)|θt] ≤− ηt(1 + L(θt))(1− Lηt(1 + L(θ
t))
2
)‖∇L(θt)‖22 +
Lη2t (1 + L(θt))2
2
σ2
+ ηt‖∇L(θt)‖22 +
1
2
Lη2t ‖∇L(θt)‖22
=− ηt(L(θt)− Lηt
2
)‖∇L(θt)‖22 +
Lη2t (1 + L(θt))2
2
σ2
(9)
Taking telescope sum of 9 over t = 0, . . . , T − 1, we obtain
T−1∑
t=0
ηt(E[L(θt)]− Lηt
2
)E[‖∇L(θt)‖22] ≤ E[L(θ0)− L(θT )] +
T−1∑
t=0
Lη2t (1 + E[L(θt)])2
2
σ2
Choosing ηt = min(2 ∗ E[L(θt)]/L− 1/L,
√
∆/TLσ2), if E[L(θt)] > 1/2, then we can show that
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[‖∇L(θt)‖22] ≤ 2
which completes the proof.
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